My Blog; In Numbers.

Monthly Numbers

Months and Years

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
2007							265	228	511	495	350	333	2,182
2008	374	759	1,254	1,227	822	697	693	513	1,168				7,507

Average per Day

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Overall
2007							13	7	17	16	12	11	13
2008	12	26	40	41	27	23	22	17	39				27

Also, I’m quite excited that under two years, my blog, with no real effort at marketing, will be breaking 10,000 visits. Thanks everyone for helping me make this collection of my intellectual expeditions successful!

Dear God, Thank you.

Thank you for showing me both love and mercy. My heart flows free with the honey of your compassion. Your grace floods my body with an ecstasy beyond explanation, and the evidence of your design in my upcoming marriage is shockingly beautiful. Hair raising. Heart pounding. Blood pumping.

If words could encompass the absolute beauty of your designed institution of marriage, I would not be worthy of putting it to pen. Your designs are flawless, and your measure is beyond my understanding. I fall flat with thanks, for I am not worthy of such a woman. Thanks again, for showing me such mercy.

Through this, I can merely utter my thanks, for providing me with not only a woman of my dreams, but more so the dreams you so perfectly knew would be best for me. You are truly a wonder, in every sense of the word, and I pray my marriage will be a reflection of such wonder. I pray my every day may be founded in the joy of exploring that wonder that dazzles me so.

May we, as one flesh, seek you, as all Love.

Amen.

The Military’s Next Great Debate

Leonard O Goenaga

                                                                                                            9-18-08

                                                                                                            INR3203

                                                                                                            Paper 2

The Military’s Next Great Debate

It is no myth to emphasize the troubles the U.S. military experienced when first dealing with the insurgency within Iraq. It is also no myth to emphasize the success seen by the Surge, both for turning the pace of the negative war, as well as countering both the political and physical influence of the insurgents.  After lessons were learned from these two stages of the war in Iraq, a great debate is now stirring within the midst of the Army community. This great debate focuses around two questions: “First, why, after its promising start, did Operation Iraqi Freedom go so badly wrong? Second, how should the hard-earned lessons of Iraq inform future policy?” (Bacevich).

This great military debate involves two separate groups. The first of these groups contains individuals whom attribute the difficulties faced during Operation Iraqi Freedom as belonging to errors committed by the military itself. This group, including General Petraeus, argues that counter-insurgency must not only focus on conventional war, but focus on socially changing a nation. An early inspiration of this first group includes individuals who believe the war in Vietnam could have been won, given emphasis was continued on the ‘winning hearts and minds’ of the Vietnamese, in combination with the search and destroy missions. This strategy in Vietnam, which they argued could have brought success, was instead shortened by the lack of patience and guts of the American people and their politicians. They argue, as the success of the surge and its counter-insurgency policy, that stabilizing nations is the root of preventing environments that create instability, and thus brood with anti-Americanism (which thus lead to such terrorist activity). This camp argues that “the United States can prevail in “stability operations” as long as commanders grasp the true nature of the problem and respond appropriately,” (Bacevich). The better the military becomes at changing societies (learning languages, understanding cultural issues) over refining engagement and weapons, the further chance of success in environments like Vietnam and Iraq.

The second camp, led by Colonel Gentile, disagrees with this ‘Petraeus Doctrine’, and instead argued against the idea of such a change. They tend to agree more with the style of combat defined in the “Powell Doctrine,” which argued instead for quick overwhelming forces, ending combat quickly and decisively. These individuals attribute the success of the surge and Gen. Petraeus efforts to the ‘pay for cooperation’ method that focused on buying the aid of Sunni’s and former insurgents. These individuals fear that the focus on social rebuilding will remove the importance of strengthened conventional warfare, which could prove militarily disastrous. It will be quite interesting to see which camp comes out on top.

 

Bacevich, Andrew J. “The Petraeus Doctrine?” The Atlantic.com. October 2008. 18 Sept. 2008

<http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200810/petraeus-doctrine/2>.

Charles Darwin & Religion

I found many of these interesting:

“1. “The mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble by us; and I for one must be content to remain an Agnostic.” (Autobiography)

2. “It seems to me absurd to doubt that a man may be an ardent Theist & an evolutionist.” (Letter to John Fordyce, May 7 1879)

3. “I hardly see how religion & science can be kept as distinct as [Edward Pusey] desires… But I most wholly agree… that there is no reason why the disciples of either school should attack each other with bitterness.” (Letter to J. Brodie Innes, November 27 1878)

4. “In my most extreme fluctuations I have never been an atheist in the sense of denying the existence of a God.” (Letter to John Fordyce, May 7 1879)

5. “I think that generally (& more and more so as I grow older) but not always, that an agnostic would be the most correct description of my state of mind.” (Letter to John Fordyce, May 7 1879)

6. “I am sorry to have to inform you that I do not believe in the Bible as a divine revelation, & therefore not in Jesus Christ as the son of God.” (Letter to Frederick McDermott, November 24 1880)

7. [In conversation with the atheist Edward Aveling, 1881] “Why should you be so aggressive? Is anything gained by trying to force these new ideas upon the mass of mankind?” (Edward Aveling, The religious views of Charles Darwin, 1883)

8. “Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?” (Letter to Graham William, July 3 1881)

9. “My theology is a simple muddle: I cannot look at the Universe as the result of blind chance, yet I can see no evidence of beneficent Design.” (Letter to Joseph Hooker, July 12 1870)

10. “I can never make up my mind how far an inward conviction that there must be some Creator or First Cause is really trustworthy evidence.” (Letter to Francis Abbot, September 6 “

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article4772296.ece

The Georgian Crises and the Presidential Candidates

Leonard O Goenaga
9-4-08
INR3203
Paper 1

The Georgian Crises and the Presidential Candidates

Recently, it has appeared that the once hibernating bear of the Far East woke from an extensive slumber. Although many would claim the dreadful chapter in human history of the Cold War to be over, we now enter into a state which appears to be a throwback to strained American and Russian Cold War relations. After what the Russians claimed to be a peacekeeping mission, and what the Georgians claim to be a move of Russian aggression, the Russian military invaded ‘disputed territories’ with overwhelming military force. Within a short while, the Russians quickly dismantled the Georgian military, ignored the European community, and defied commitments to cease-fire agreements. As interesting as the situation is in terms of what it tells us of the Cold War, the conflict also serves a secondary purpose: Revealing how our current presidential candidates will respond to foreign policy crises.

In analyzing both McCain and Obama in their responses, one thing becomes quite clear: The difference between the two candidates is dramatic. On one corner, McCain took probably the most political advantageous approach of responding with stern condemnation. In the other corner, Obama took a more pensive diplomatic approach, seeking the advice of his 300 or so foreign policy advisors. Although Obama tended to respond more softly, after a series of opinionated changes, Obama’s conclusive response echoed somewhat that of McCain’s. Although a measurable degree of diplomacy is desirable, the usage of a bureaucracy of foreign policy aides puts into question the decisiveness of a candidate seeking a position whose worth is in decision making.

Although the value of diplomacy is clearly opulent, it is also a valuable skill to gauge when one needs to stand firm and decisive, vs. standing diplomatic and patient. With an ever expansionistic Russia in play, and such failed diplomatic issues with Iran and N. Korea on the horizon, one could effectively argue the better approach to Russia being that of stern decisive opposition. Regardless of which of the two sides is right, and I myself would agree to that of McCain’s, the issue is none-the-less enlightening in that it gives us a sneak peak into how these two, regardless of which enters the oval office, will respond to issues of international crises. 

 

Source (MLA, APA)

Bumiller, Elisabeth. “A Cast of 300 Advises Obama on Foreign Policy.” NyTimes.com. 18 July

2008. NY Times. 4 Sept. 2008 <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/18/us/politics/18advisers.html?ex=1374120000&en=550e6f6c4438701b&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink>.

Ignatius, David. “Hot or Cool on Russia?” Real Clear Politics.com. 4 Sept. 2008. 4 Sept. 2008

<http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/09/containment_the_best_way_to_de.html>.