The Decline of Institutionalized Religion, and the Future of Faith in Europe.

Leonard O Goenaga

Professor Thiel

CPO3103

November 24, 2008

The Decline of Institutionalized Religion, and the Future of Faith in Europe.

 When asked to define Western European historical identity, several things come to mind: the birth of the Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation, the Scientific revolution, the birthplace of democracy, the enlightenment, modernism, secularization, and others. Given the Western European innovations mentioned, many individuals look to Western Europe as a model for future states. Individuals may make the genuine error of observing an overt secularizing trend within Europe, and mistakenly deposit such a prediction for the world as a whole. They, like the Hebrew Prophets and modern Evangelists, herald the message of secularization as if a predestined destination for man. Given the standards Europe has set for much of the world, this understanding may at first sound reasonable. However, given the diversity of the world, the rise of religious fundamentalisms, and other factors, such a prophecy may be premature. With Europe’s profound religious history, as both the vehicle of Roman Catholicism and the home of the Protestant reformation, it is fascinating to find it to be the home of secularization. To ignore Western Europe as a trendsetter is asinine, and as such, a survey of the nature of Religion in Europe is warranted and rewarding. What can such a survey accomplish? Is the claim of Western Europe as secular genuine? Are the predictions that a totally secularized Europe grounded?  Are there any exceptions or revivals? This paper will survey the current state of European religious health, analyzing the trends of religious decline, the increase in secularization, and the exceptions of religious stability and growth in Europe. This paper will explore and conclude whether a possible cure for Europe’s religious sickness appears on the horizon, or whether it is plagued to continue in its trend of pluralism and secularization.

            It is interesting that when we refer to Western Europe, we speak of a division from its eastern counterpart by means of some imaginary line produced between former communist countries and the parliamentary western states. However, a more historical, and some would argue more profound, division existed way before the development of Marx’ communist ideology. This first great division between Western and Eastern Europe is an important religious one: The split between Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy. Before an exploration of the state of religion in Europe is made, the divided identity of Europe needs clarification. From this Eastern and Western divide, with the West inheriting a Roman Catholic tradition (which later led to the reformation, with strong protestant movements in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Scandinavian countries), and the East inheriting Orthodoxy, we receive an illuminating understanding to the continental divide, as well as certain nation-bound religious inclinations. Exactly which nations do we speak of when we refer to Eastern and Western Europe? For the West, we mean those traditionally Roman Catholic countries, including but not limited to the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Scandinavian states, and others. For the East, we refer to nations that belong to the Orthodoxy tradition, including Romania, Bulgaria, and Russia.[1] This leaves out several countries, including those of Central Europe, which may be defined not only by its Ex-Communist identity, but also by its religious affiliations. The Central European countries of “Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and what was East Germany…[also] developed within Western Catholicism,” which may be revealing in understanding their European identities, and their similarities with the traditionally Western nations (Davie 4). Having established an understandable division of Europe on a historical level of religious traditions, we may now continue our evaluation of religion within Europe, with particular focus on the reformed countries (Protestant United Kingdom, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries), traditionally Catholic countries (Italy, France, and Poland), and interesting European religious innovations (as found by Islam, New Age, and Christian revivals in Europe).

The first assumption made in the discussion of religion in Europe, is that it is a spiritual desert. Missionaries will preach the message of the need for a spiritual awakening in the land of Luther and Calvin. Compared to the Americans, where churches are vibrant, active, and visible, Europe’s Christianity seems somewhat belittled in comparison. Many surveys have expressed the importance religion plays in individual’s lives, and in one such survey Europeans averaged 21%, compared to a hefty 90% average of individuals in Muslim nations, and around 60% for Americans in 2002 (Jenkins 27). Further still, individuals in Europe do not merely express dissatisfaction with religion through a lack of church attendance, but also out right claiming atheism, with “a survey of British respondents in 2004… [finding] only 44 percent admitting to belief in God, with 35 percent denying that belief, and 21 percent ‘don’t know,’” (Jenkins 27). In addition, France saw an increase from individuals claiming no religion grow from 11% to 34% between the years 1973 and 1944 (Jenkins 27).

This decline in the belief of God is not the only indicator of spiritual corrosion. In addition, core Christian doctrines have seen sizable declines. “In 1957, 71 percent of British respondents declared that Jesus was the Son of God, but by 2001, the figure had fallen to 38 percent,” (Jenkins 27). Another core Christian Orthodox belief has seen tremendous decline as well. Belief in the historical existence of Jesus shows a sharp decline between age groups, with 80% of those over 65 believing in the historicity of Christ, compared to only 54% of those between the ages of 18-24 (Jenkins 27).  A third leg of study that individuals point to in their arguments for a secularized Europe is that of Church attendance. Compared to about 40% of Americans who report weekly attending some place of worship, only about 20% of Europeans do the same (Jenkins 28).[2] Lower still, Britain boasts of about 15%, Germany 12%, and the Scandinavian countries below 5% (Jenkins 28). The evidence is stacked higher still, when one looks at the numbers of individuals who never attend services. “As of 2000, though, such absentees made up 60 percent of French respondents, 55 percent in Britain, and between 40 percent and 50 percent in Scandinavia and the Low Countries,” (Jenkins 28). With these statistics, it would appear that organized Christianity has taken an insignificant backseat to Europeans. Post-1975, “Britain’s churches lost around 20 percent of their adult membership,” similarly, in Germany, the Evangelical Church (EKD), has lost about half it’s membership in the last half-century (Jenkins 28). One can only conclude that within the traditionally protestant countries (Britain, Germany, Denmark, etc.), institutionalized Christianity is in a crisis, but can the same be said of their Catholic neighbors? Also, is a declined in the practice of denominational Protestantism enough to conclude a death of it, or as Grace Davie coins, do we merely find a situation of ‘believing without belonging,” (Davie 8)?

Off the bat, one will notice that traditionally Catholic countries have faired this secularized weather better than their Protestant counterparts. According to 1990 statistics, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain averaged 85% in a belief of God, 67% in a belief of a soul, 51% in a belief of life after death, and 57% in a belief of Heaven.[3] This is in comparison with the European averages of 70% for God, 61% for a soul, 43% for life after death, and 41% for heaven (Davie 10).[4] Although these statistics may strengthen the image of Catholicism in comparison to European Protestantism, it does not tell us whether Catholicism in Europe has seen a decline. One indicator we may study in the pursuit of analyzing the health of Catholicism is that of the sacred sacraments. Between the years of 1975 and 1990, “Catholic baptisms in Europe fell by 34 percent, [and] the number of weddings by 41 percent,” (Jenkins 30). Although this may be explained partially by a drop of fertility rates and the sizes of families, it still projects an image of the state of Catholicism.[5]

In addition to looking at the state of Holy Catholic sacraments, we again turn to the state of church attendance in traditionally Catholic strongholds. In Italy and Spain, service attendance has seen a “decline since the early 1990s”, (Jenkins 32). When this decline in church attendance is placed besides a decrease in sacraments and shrinkage of birthrates and family sizes, a picture of an aging Catholic community slowly phasing itself out is visible. Reflecting the aging and shrinkage of followers is an aging and shrinkage of priests. “Europe as a whole had 250,000 priests in 1978…but that number fell to 200,000 by 2003,” (Jenkins 32). In addition to the fall of the number of priests, is a fall in the number of individuals attending seminaries. “In most west European countries, whether we are looking at vocations or seminarians, the present figure is commonly one-tenth of what it was forty years ago,” (Jenkins 33). [6] Our survey of Catholicism is thus telling: Although clearly in better shape than their Protestant brethren, Catholicism in Europe is seeing a crisis in the form of church attendance, shrinking family sizes, declines in taken sacraments, an aging and shrinking priesthood, and a reduction in religious orders (monks, nuns, etc.). With a stark difference in religious practice and belief among Europe’s youth compared to older Europeans, one is left asking how Catholicism (after a somewhat failed reform in the Vatican II), with an aging priesthood, will tackle both the issue of Catholic cultural identity and the pluralistic and materialistic youth of Europe’s tomorrow.

With the given review of the state of institutionalized Christianity in Europe, one is left feeling that the state of Europe is overwhelming secularized. One may even make the mistake of going as far as echoing Nietzsche’s infamous words, that in Europe, ‘God is Dead’. According to Andrew Greely, the statement is a bit inaccurate. He points out that to make the statement God is dead in Europe, and only have “East Germany and the Czech Republic…[with a] majority of respondents say[ing] they don’t believe in God,” is a bit unfair. Hardly could we consider God ‘dead’, but rather not well in some countries. In traditional Catholic countries, God is hardly near death, and in mixed and northern protestant countries, he is more ill than dead. In addition, we will find that in countries boasting of low numbers (Scandinavian and post-socialist countries), there have been considerable changes. The next question then, is what type of God do Europeans believe? “The proportions who believe in a concerned God are in the 30 percent range in Britain, West Germany, Norway, Denmark, and generally lower in the former socialist countries,” (Greeley 5). This would reject the concerned Abrahamic God, and thus begs the question whether Europeans adhere to Pascal’s wager, or really believe in this unconcerned God. Either or, we are left searching for more clues about the nature of this ‘Euro-God’. What is the relationship between these Europeans and this God? Is this is just some Pascalian projection; is the traditional God dying?

Looking at the two major studies in Europeans beliefs, the European Values Study project (EVS) and the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), we find contrasting returns. In the EVS, we find a decline in belief within Spain from 91%-86%, in the Netherlands 71%-65%, and an increase in Hungary from 55%-65% (Greeley 7). However, in the ISSP, “there is neither a decline for Spain nor for the Netherlands,” (Greeley). Thus, Greeley concludes “one can assert cautiously that there is no strong tendency for belief in God to be declining in Europe for the last twenty years and some surprising increases in two of the former communist countries,” (Greely 7-8).[7] With atheism and Gnosticism hardly popular positions within Europe, and belief in God still remaining the majority position, we must ask why. Are there any signs of a growing spirituality? If not, is there any evidence to suggest that mankind’s spiritual concerns are not in a total decline reflective of Secularization theory and declining church attendance? One area Greeley explores is the belief in life after death. Interestingly, he finds that the Hungary and Italy show a long-term increase.[8] He also points out at the ESV and ISSR disagree in their findings, with the ESV showing decreases in N. Ireland, Britain, and Spain, while the ISSP shows an increase in Slovenia and Britain (Greeley 22-23).[9]

These mixed results overtly reject any claim for a decrease of European spiritually. However, Greeley points out an interesting phenomenon. “There is a ‘U-curve’ relationship between belief in life after death and birth cohorts with those born before 1929 and those born in the 1960s and 1970s having the highest levels of belief in human survival and those born in the 1940s and 1950s having the lowest scores,” (Greeley 23). In comparing the rates of belief in life after death by cohort between the years of 1955 and 1980, one finds a significant increase in the Scandinavian, European Union, and Post-Socialist countries (Greeley 28).[10]  In addition, Protestants, Catholics, Orthodox, and Muslims all see increases in the belief in life after death by birth cohort (Greeley 28).[11] With the evidence collected, Greeley rightfully acknowledges “with the exception of some East European countries, majorities in all European countries believe in life after death” (Greeley 28). This begs the question whether we’ll see a similar reaction in our day, as individuals attend church and withdraw into religious norms as they age.  With a decline in institutionalized Christianity recognized, yet the existence of faith and hope acknowledged, we must now ask ourselves what new modes of faith could possibly account and take advantage of this change.

In The Post-War Generation & Establishment Religion, Roof, Carroll and Roozen conclude, “religious establishments—whether legal or cultural—have substantially weakened if not collapsed in most of the nations that we have considered,” (245). However, it also recognizes that:

Religion is not in danger of disappearing…[the post-war generation’s] participation in more traditional forms of religion may have declined, but many baby boomers—perhaps the majority—have not rejected religion. Instead, they appear to be reshaping religion, providing alternative definitions of religious reality and forms of involvement, (Roof, Carroll and Rozen 247).

After having acknowledged the decline of institutions, and recognized the existence of a faith and belief in the afterlife, we can agree with Roof’s conclusions, and next explore these new modes of faith and spirituality. Here, we will explore the importation of Islam, ‘New Christianity’, and other worth-mentioning religious movements.

            A discussion of religion in Europe would not be complete without highlighting the importation of Islam and it’s followers within Europe. One must first recognize, that out of the influx of millions of immigrants within Europe, “Muslims…[account] for about 40 percent of all European immigrants,” and as such, one understands global migration to be “the engine that brings Islam…to the heart of the continent,” (Byrnes and Katzenstein 209). With such a tremendous influx of Muslims, and their high birthrates and growth, Islam situates itself as one of the religious giants within Europe. However, Islam is quite unique in it’s dilemma. As the product of immigration, a two-fold Islamic identity occurs: that between Euro-Islam, and Shari’a-Islam (Byrnes and Katzestein 210). This powerful religion finds itself tugged in two directions: 1) The urged integration of Islamic culture within European identity, Euro-Islam, and 2) The preservation of imported Islam via the models and leaderships of their foreign-based countries, as well as the proselytization of Europe, Shari’a-Islam. The conflict is tremendous, as at their cores European and traditional Islamic ideas clash.  In addition, this Euro-Islam and Shari’a-Islam versions within Islam ideologically clash. How exactly do these immigrants properly integrate within the European model, yet at the same time preserve the Islamic ideas that form the foundation of their beliefs? Visible by the numerous anti-immigration policies and the rise of xenophobic parties within Europe, as well as the existence of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist activities (Madrid bombings, British Bus bombings, etc.), one is inclined to throw his or her hands in the air in surrendering to the enormity of the task present.

How can Europe, with an ever growing Islamic population, and its so-called secularizing culture, prevent a clash between itself and its Islamic fellows? How does Europe find Muslims who wish to integrate without seeking to Islamize all of Europe? Sadly, this paper cannot provide an answer to these very difficult questions, but rather we wish to highlight these questions that relate to Islam’s growth within Europe. Islam has managed to successfully adapt to societies before, so can we expect to find ‘Italian Islam’ and ‘British Islam,’ (Jenkins 121)? Either-or, an alliance between Europeans and Euro-Islam must be created to combat the development of Islamic extremism, not merely just attempts to remove the problem by removing Muslim immigrants (which in turn may increase tensions and thus extremism). We must also admit that even if Europeans open up the channels of discussion, these two forces will go nowhere unless Islam itself reforms from within. A leading example of this is found in the words of French Muslim leader Soheib Bencheikh of Marseille, who said:

“The separation between religion and politics will clarify Islam as a divine spiritual doctrine, not as an instrument which (can) be misused to gain power. Moreover, due to that, Islam can return its original formulation, meaning it will return as the promoted teaching not as a forced teaching—as the Koran affirms—“Anyone who will believe may believe, and anyone who will be an infidel may be an infidel! (Jenkins 144-145)

In addition to Islam, we find another growing force within Europe. We dub this, ‘New Christianity’. Similar to the importation of Islam, African, East Asian, and Latin American countries have brought their Christianity with them (Jenkins 87). It is interesting that, although the older whiter Christian Europeans seem to be in decline, a new source of Christians are streaming successfully from these immigrant sources. This has both the benefits of possible evangelization of those lost Europeans, and also offsetting the growth of Muslim immigrants (although their numbers are much smaller). We may even predict that the evangelization of Europe comes from this fresh Christian source. “In England, for instance, the conversion in the seventh century was largely the work of Mediterranean missionaries,” (Jenkins 87). With this recognized, we must ask ourselves what are the characteristics of this Christianity?

One of these sources is the African Christian movement. One such example of a successful African church is that of the Embassy of the Blessed Kingdom of God for all Nations. Founded by Sunday Adelaja in Kiev, this church soon grew to some 30,000 members (Jenkins 88).[12] Sunday’s Pentecostal congregation continued in growth, and even found such members as the major of Kiev. However, Sunday Adelaja is only one of many third world evangelists. A Nigerian by the name of Matthew Ashimolowo founded the Kingsway International Christian Centre in 1992, which grew from 300 members to now 5,000 (Jenkins 89). In addition, these evangelists are readily taking advantage of television, radio, and the Internet to spread their messages across the globe. In addition to these individuals, we cannot ignore the importance of John Sentamu, who being a Ugandan, was inaugurated as the new Archbishop of York in 2005 (Jenkins 88). We are also seeing a rise of a tremendous Black church network, consisting of Pentecostal, Charismatic, and Evangelical mega churches.[13] “In 2005, the Church Census found that people of African or Afro-Caribbean stock accounted for 10 percent of Sunday churchgoers in England, a number rising to 44 percent in London: nonwhite ethnic groups made up another 14 percent of London’s worshipers,” (Jenkins 92).

In addition to this imported Christianity, we find new religious movements and evangelical Christian restructuring. With the anti-establishment and anti-institutional spirit of Europe, it is of no surprise that we find certain movements benefiting from such attitudes. Two, whom have benefited, with their focus on individualistic experience and growth, are New Age spiritualism, and Evangelical/Fundamentalist Protestantism (Roof, Carroll and Rozen 251).[14] Baby-boomers seem to be drawn to the first of these two groups: New Age spiritualism. Although difficult to define, this movement “ranges from the use of crystals, to astrology, to ‘earth religion’, to some expressions of the occult, and (especially in the United States) to numerous ‘twelve step,’ self-help grounds patterned after Alcoholics Anonymous,” (Roof, Carroll and Rozen 250). In essence, this movement contains a mystical eastern spiritualist appeal, and we find Baby Boomers borrowing from this pool of practices to develop their own personalized religion. This popularity is only underscored by the Spiritual trends mentioned in the beginning of this paper. In addition to New Age mysticism, conservative Protestantism has found itself a new home. “Such groups both retain a higher proportion of their baby boom members and gain more of those who switch religious affiliation,” (Roof, Carroll and Roozen 250). Individuals may perhaps turn to the conservative denominations for their modern media-styled worship, their large mega churches, their small groups, and their individualized focus. In addition, within a world of constant dizzying change and choices, individuals may also be attracted to the firm absolutes of their moral systems, and their clear standards, versus the constant barrage of pluralism they face (Roof, Carroll, and Roozen 251).

Having analyzed a decline in the belief of a concerned God, and the decrease of belief in key Christian dogma, as well as having analyzed a relatively stable (if not growing) spiritualism, we are left asking ourselves for a prediction of the future of religion in Europe. Looking at trends of institutionalized worship; we must admit that the future of organized religion initially looks grim. However, we must also ask ourselves this question: is the land of Calvin and Luther ripe for religious revival? Having looked at various new modes of faith, and having acknowledged a growth in the belief of a transcendental order and afterlife, the scenario surely seems ripe. Given that institutionalized religion has had its brand image tarnished, we cannot conclude that the situation will spiral to non-existence. If anything, perhaps the face of religion as Europe knows it is not declining, but changing. Perhaps a religious mutation, guided by the force of imported religious beliefs and believers, as well as that of individualism, are preparing to take root. Even if this were not to be the case, a study of these growing religious realms is extremely important, as continuing immigration of Islam, and the potential Islamization of Europe, are important to future foreign policy affairs. [15]

What of the future of Islam in Europe? Having analyzed the trends given, we may come up with a prediction. With the race riots in the US individuals thought such conflicts were to be common. Some claimed that a schism on the ground of races was a long-term effect. However, with time, this happened not to be the case. The races, although having had that short-term conflict, have integrated rather tremendously. Telling of the fullness of this integration is the election of a black American for President. Although blacks in the United States hardly had the same religious and ideological footing as Islam, the thought depicts hope none-the-less. Although Europeans face terribly short-term conflicts, with Muslims suffering from a sudden flash-flood lesson in modernization, perhaps Europe’s future will be similar to America’s race riot experience. Perhaps, although difficult short term, Muslims will develop a successful long-term Euro-Islam (Jenkins 287).

In addition, a positive to the negativity of a conflicting Islam is found in the form of possibly turning people towards Christianity. With such a cultural clash being played out, Europeans, in opposition to Islam, may turn to their Christian roots (Jenkins 287-288). In addition, if individuals consider their religious roots more seriously, perhaps they will also take their religious beliefs with renewed devotion. To add to this mix the elements of evangelism brought forth by African, Asian, Latin American, and Caribbean Christians, a possible revival is foreseen. Although the traditional institutions have lost face, perhaps this renewed attitude towards religion, and the successful minority forces developing more contemporary styles of worship and practice, can lead to an increase in practice. With European Christianity in such a state of earlier mentioned decline, perhaps a rock bottom has been hit. Perhaps the face of Christianity is changing towards a more contemporary-styled approach. Surely this is not the end of Christianity, and having explained some possible avenues for growth, we may now conclude by asking one final question: Is this really the worst scenario religion has seen in Europe?

In conclusion, although transcendental beliefs and the future of Islam, evangelical Protestantism, and immigrant religions brighten the picture, some claim that European religion is doomed to secularization. Some, similar to end-time prophets, tend to claim that the end is near. This leads us to answer our question by exploring Europe’s historical precedent:

Arguably the worst single moment in the history of west European Christianity occurred around 1798, with the Catholic Church under severe persecution in much of Europe, and skeptical, deist, and Unitarian movements in the ascendant across the Atlantic world. (Jenkins 288).

Perhaps individuals living within those ages made similar claims that the end of religion was near. However, from this overturned soil came the building of “the great missionary movement of the nineteenth century, the second evangelical revival, and the Catholic devotional revolution,” (Jenkins 288). In addition, nothing tends to spur on evangelism and devotion more than the appearance that one’s faith is about to become extinct (Jenkins 289). In conclusion, as Christianity grew under the oppression and persecution of Nero, perhaps the idea that Christianity and religion in Europe is under secularized persecution, accompanied by the immigrated forces and internal remodeling, will lead to it’s renewal. In the words of Odon Vallet, “If you are the type of person who buys stocks and bonds, I’d buy Christianity. The price is very low…it has to go up,” (Jenkins 283).

            Works Cited

Byrnes, Timothy A., and Peter J. Katzenstein. Religion in an Expanding Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Davie, Grace. Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Greeley, Andrew M. Religion in Europe at the End of the Second Millennium: A Sociological Profile. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003.

Jenkins, Philip. God’s Continent: Christianity, Islam, and Europe’s religious crisis. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Roof, Wade Clark, Jackson W. Carroll, and David A. Roozen. The Post-War Generation

and Establishment Religion . Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1995.

[1] An overt exception is that of Greece, which maintained an Eastern Orthodox tradition.

[2] Compared to the numbers given for the EVSSG, the European Values Study (a major cross-national study of human values), the 1990 average for Europe was 29%. Here we see a 9% decline (Davie 8).

[3] Statistics averaged with information taken by Ashford and Timms (1992: 40); and EVSSG data. Information found in table 1.2 of Davis).

[4] France was excluded from these averages as the historical settings of secularism and Catholicism within the country throws overall Catholic indicators off. The French 1981 EVSSG divides France from the Catholic grouping, and instead places it in ‘region laique’, or ‘non-recognizing countries (France, Belgium, and the Netherlands).

[5] In the 1970s, Catholics traditionally had “almost a half child per woman” more than the rest of European countries. By the 1990s, they average lower than their Protestant counterparts (Jenkins 30).

[6] Orders of Monks and nuns have also seen a decline. “In 1960, France had thirty nuns for every 10,000 Catholics, but by 2000, the figure was only ten,” (Jenkins 33-34).

[7] Between the years of 1991 and 1998, the ISSP boasts of significant increased in belief in God within Russia (48%-60%), with relatively moderate numbers within other European countries. Other increases found within the ISSP are Italy (86%-88%), Spain (79%-81%), Austria (79%-81%), Slovenia (61%-63%), and the Netherlands (55%-58%).

[8] Last two Decades of the century: Hungary 17% to 39%, Italy from 57% to 72%.

[9] Increased in France found within the ESV. Also, increased in the ISSP show Slovenia from 33%-42% and Britain from 54%-59%.

[10] See Figure 2.3, (Greeley 27). EU Nations see a jump of about 12%, Scandinavian about 20%, and Post-Socialist about 20%+.

[11] See Figure 2.4, (Greeley 28).

[12] Interesting to note, as it relates to the earlier made prediction of immigrants leading the next great revival, is that the majority of this church’s adherents were white.

[13] Examples of these mega churches, with claimed weekly attendance: Kingway International Christian Centre (10-12,000), Kensington Temple (5,500), Hillsong Church (5,000), Ruach Ministries (4,000), Glory House (3,000), etc. Information taken from Table 4.1, Jenkins 92).

[14] We also find tremendous gains in Pentecostal and Charismatic movements, yet having touched upon them earlier, we will include them under the branch of Evangelical.

[15] By ‘Islamization of Europe’, we do not mean that Europe will suddenly become Muslim, but that with a growing Muslim population possibly taking up 10% of Europe’s population in the future, the need to understand Islam is intensified.


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