JUDITH THOMSON’S ‘VIOLINIST ANALOGY,’ NORMATIVE & COERCIVE PREGNANCIES, AND THE WEIGHT OF CONSENT

PHI7550 Final Exam – JUDITH THOMSON’S ‘VIOLINIST ANALOGY,’ NORMATIVE & COERCIVE PREGNANCIES, AND THE WEIGHT OF CONSENT

QUESTION 1:  Some people argue that Judith Thomson’s argument seems applicable only to pregnancy resulting from rape, where the sex was not voluntary.  If you do not agree because you believe it applies in other cases, explain and defend your view.  If you agree that Thomson’s argument does apply exclusively to cases of rape, why does it not apply to cases where sex is voluntary?

Judith Thomson’s ‘Violinist Analogy,’ Normative & Coercive Pregnancies, and the Weight of Consent

In her essay defending abortion, Judith Thomson sets out to demonstrate the moral permissibility of pursuing abortion as a means to defend oneself from the invasive parasitical growth of a fetus. Although these words seem to be incredibly incendiary, if not excessive, they do allude to Thomson’s overall point:

In our case there are only two people involved, one whose life is threatened, and one who threatens it. Both are innocent: the one who is threatened is not threatened because of any fault, the one who threatens does not threaten because of any fault. For this reason we may feel that we bystanders cannot intervene. But the person threatened can. In sum, a woman surely can defend her life against the threat to it posed by the unborn child, even if doing so involves death. (Thomson 212.

Thomson proceeds throughout her essay to argue in this direction, utilizing various thought tests to provoke the reader into blurring the line of life’s sanctity. This is made especially so in her famous violinist analogy, where through such a thought test, she seeks to ask the reader if performing an act analogizing abortion is morally permissible. It is my conclusion that Judith Thomson’s Violinist Abortion analogy fails in addressing abortion at large, and instead, it may be said that the analogy only applies to cases of rape. Even then, it is my conclusion that this too does not seem to fit, for the analogy disagrees in fundamental ways with the incident of pregnancy as a result of rape as well.

I. Thomson’s Violinist Analogy

Early in her essay, Thomson makes some surprising concessions. High among them includes the concession of personhood, whereas she states that she is “ inclined to think also that we shall probably have to agree that the fetus has already become a human person well before birth,” (209). She then proceeds to allow the premise that the fetus is both a human life and a person, for the sake of argument, to argue on other grounds that abortion is morally permissible. After such concessions, she introduces us to her violinist analogy. It is roughly summarized as an incident where you one day wake up to find that a society of music lovers have attached a world-renowned violinist to your kidneys. The violinist is now dependent on utilizing your kidneys to process poisons, and if you choose to detach yourself from said violinist, he will surely die. It is suggested that you are under no obligation, but “if you do allow him to go on using your kidneys this is a kindness on your part, and not something he can claim from you as his due,” (214). As such, “you gave him no right to use your kidneys, and no one else can have given him any such right,” (214). Thomson uses this analogy to finally argue that in this incident you would be morally permitted to unplug yourself, and therefore that “the right of life consist not in the right not to be killed, but rather in the right not to be killed unjustly,” (215). Our question then becomes this: given the role the analogy plays in demonstrating a case where one may arguably be justified in unplugging oneself and producing the death of an innocent life, does it properly represent all incidents of abortion, or simply special cases? It is in the opinion of this paper that the analogy hardly represents cases of rape, for several important elements are lacking. It is to these elements via a comparison of the analogy and its real world counterpart that we now turn.

II. Scenario Analysis

The analogy in this event seeks to analogize a real scenario. Scenarios are made up of events, acts, and persons (actors). Thus, the Violinist analogy seeks to analogize the events, acts, and persons (actors) in the scenario of abortion. We will seek to evaluate and weigh the events, acts, and persons of both the analogy and the real scenario, to judge whether the violinist analogy properly fits the event in question (namely, that her analogy addresses all cases of abortion and not simply ones responding to rape).

1. Analogized Real Scenario (RE, RA, RP)

In this case, the real event being analogized is that of sexual reproduction and the permissibility of abortion as a response to becoming pregnant. In order to compare the analogy with its real world counterpart, and determine whether it exclusively speaks to rape or some other incident, we must break down both in units of comparison.

1.1 Analysis of Analogized Real Event (Sex & Pregnancy)

First to be analyzed involves the event of sex and pregnancy. From here we quickly observe three kinds of encounters. The first represents an encounter where a man and woman engage in consensual sex with the desire to become pregnant. We will not address this first incident, for the method of dealing with the pregnancy is bringing the child to term. The second, here forth noted as RE1, includes cases of consensual sex that result in unwanted pregnancies. The third encounter, here forth noted as RE2, includes incidents of coerced sex (rape), which result in undesired pregnancies. It may be noticed that the term ‘desire’ was used instead of ‘consented’ pregnancy, and this was done with good reason. It is the opinion of this paper that one can never truly consent to pregnancy. One can surely consent to the sole natural act, which produces pregnancy (willingly engaging in sex), but one cannot simply consent to becoming pregnant anymore than one can consent to becoming wet when they willingly walk into the rain. Regardless of the means of protection, one forfeits their ability to consent to a pregnancy whenever they willingly engage in sex. We call this normative pregnancy, and we call cases of pregnancy from rape coerced pregnancy. The following analogy makes the point of the concession of consenting to becoming pregnant upon consenting to having sex:

1.1.1 Analogy: The Robber and the Homeowner I

In a civil society, a man may choose to break into a house. He may make every effort not to get caught. He may wear a ski mask to prevent facial detection. He may wear gloves to prevent leaving fingerprints. He may even rob the house when he knows no one is home. In addition, this person may not consent to being punished (who of his character would approve of getting caught and jailed?). However, his consent of receiving punishment and getting caught in no way removes him from rightly being punished and jailed. The natural civil result of this man’s action is to be jailed. Given this is a cause (jail) of his action (robbery), his consenting over it is useless. One may very well say that by his act of robbing a house, he is consenting to the event of getting punished, or surrendering his consent to being punished altogether, given this is the natural result in a civil society of robbing houses. The same may be said of sexual encounters. The only 100% method of not getting pregnant is in fact to not have sex. When one has sex, like the robber consenting to the effect of his causation, one is submitting their consent of pregnancy by the mere performance of the sexual engagement. One cannot really claim they did not ‘consent’ to being pregnant when they willfully ‘consented’ to having sex, for pregnancy is the natural effect of a sexual encounter. In this stream of event, true consent occurs at the moment of the Act, not the Effect. If consent is to be found, it is truly found in one’s ability to consent to performing an action. Upon consenting to an action, one is then responsible for the effect. Surely, if she consents to engaging in sex, she must be consenting to being responsible for her sex.

1.2 RA: Analysis of Analogized Real Act (Abortion)

In addition to the event being analogized, Thomson’s violinist analogy attempts to respond to the permissibility of an action. In this case, the analogized real act is abortion. This is known as the willful act on the part of the pregnant woman to utilize persons/professionals to terminate a pregnancy. Abortion is a separate event where the person responds to the occurrence of either normative or coerced pregnancies. We will refer to the analogized real act of abortion as RA1.

1.3 RP: Analysis of Analogized Real Persons (Actors)

The third and final element being analogized includes the persons who are addressing the events and performing the actions. In our case, we have two separate grounds of persons. First, we have individuals involved in normative pregnancies (RP1). Included in RP1 are the normatively pregnant woman (RP1.1), the conceived child (RP1.2), and the normative sexual partner (RP1.3). Besides RP1, we have a second group of actors in incidents of coerced pregnancies (RP2). Included in this group is the coerced/raped pregnant woman (RP2.1), the child conceived from rape (RP2.2), and the coercive sexual rapist (RP2.3).

2. Analogy Scenario (AE, AA, AP)

We may also note that we find these categories of events, actions, and persons in the violinist analogy as well. We will shortly address them as follows: the analogy event that includes the plugging of the violinist by the Music Lovers Society will here forth be noted as AE1. The analogy act including the response to the event by you unplugging the violinist will here forth be noted as AA1. Finally, the analogy persons include you (AP1.1), the violinist (AP1.2), and the music lover’s society (AP1.3)

3. Recap

An analogy attempts to draw comparisons through analogizing a real scenario. Scenarios are made up of events, which then result with persons responding to the event with certain acts. In Thomson’s case, she seeks to drawn a comparison between her analogy of a violinist and the scenario involving abortion. Specifically, she attempts to show how the act of unplugging in her analogy corresponds to the act of aborting in real life. By arguing that the act and actor are justified in her analogy scenario, she then wishes to show that the real act and actor in which the analogy portrays may also be considered justified. She then proceeds to build an argument on the assumption that this similarity. However, the analogy may be demonstrated false in representing all cases of abortion. If the analogy draws significantly weak comparisons to all cases of abortion, and instead really addresses only incidents of rape, then attempts to build a case on the assumption that it corresponds to all abortion is false, and thus removes the ability to assume such a similarity in her later argumentation, premises, and conclusion. Instead, she would be restricted to merely incidents of rape. I will then attempt to demonstrate this with a comparison of the Real and Analogy Events, Acts, and Persons. If the analogy fails in drawing comparisons with one event, and instead proves to have stronger similarities with another, than the other is to be preferred. Our upcoming attempt of comparison may outlined as follows:

1. E = Events

a.      RE1: Normative Pregnancy Event

b.      RE2: Coerced Pregnancy Event

c.      AE1: Analogy Plugging the Violinist Event

2. A = Acts

a.      RA1: Abortion

b.      AA1: Unplugging

3. P = Persons

a.      RP1: Normative Pregnancy Persons

i.       RP1.1: Normatively Pregnant Woman

ii.      RP1.2: Conceived Child

iii.     RP1.3: Consented Sexual Partner

b.      RP2: Coerced Pregnancy Persons

i.       RP2.1: Coerced Pregnant Woman

ii.      RP2.2: Conceived Child

iii.     RP2.3: Coercive Sexual Rapist

c.      AP1: Analogy Persons

i.       AP1.1: You

ii.      AP1.2: Violinist

iii.     AP1.3: Music Lovers Society

III. Scenario Comparison

1. Comparison of Events

While comparing the events pertaining to our analogy and the analogized real events of a normative and coerced pregnancy, we find that RE1 and AE1 agree only in their dependency of prior actions to produce their current states (sexual reproduction for RE1 and the plugging in AE1).[1] As for disagreements, we find that RE1 presents a natural and consented occurrence that produces pregnancy (sexual reproduction), whereas AE1 presents an unnatural and coerced action that produces the attachment of the violinist. When we compare AE1 with coerced/rape pregnancy, we find more agreements.[2] Both agree in regards to their dependency, as well as the role coercion played on the part of the rapist and the Music Lovers Society. Disagreement remained between a natural process (for sexual reproduction is the natural means of conception), and the unnatural scenario of the violinist.

2. Comparison of Acts

While comparing the real act of abortion with the analogous act of unplugging the violinist, we find the two agreeing in that both actions produce death (child and violinist), as well as both being unnatural (for children are not conceived to naturally be directly aborted, nor is the product of the violinist by any means considered natural).[3] They also disagree in that one involves a scenario where a life is directly destroyed (abortion utilizes instruments of death such as poisons and vacuums), and the other represents a scenario where the unplugging of the violinist leaves him to naturally fall victim (let die) to his kidney failure.

3. Comparison of Persons (Actors)

While comparing the persons involves in a normative pregnancy and the analogy, we find no significant agreements, and several major disagreements.[4] While comparing the normatively pregnant woman with the person in whom the violinist has been attached to, we find that the woman is pregnant as a response to natural and consented sexual encounters.[5] However, the person who’s experienced the connecting of the violinist is the victim of an unnatural and coercive event. While comparing the child conceived from a normative pregnancy to the analogy’s violinist, we find that they disagree also in the natural vs. unnatural and consented vs. coerced dynamics.[6] Most important here is that a child conceived through a physical sexual encounter is within her rightful place. It cannot be said that a child conceived through the natural means that produces the fetus (sex) rightfully belongs in any environment beyond his mother’s womb. It is the natural biological setting in which humanity begins, and for this reason we must acknowledge it as hardly the product of trespassing, for a child is always at home in her mother’s womb. This is dramatically opposed to the violinist, whereas he is clearly trespassing, for he is not in a place rightfully and naturally his. Finally, the person of the consented sexual partner and the analogy’s Music Lovers Society disagree in that one represents a natural and consenting partner, while the other represents an unnatural and coercive agitator.[7]

While comparing persons involved in a coerced pregnancy and those involved in the analogy, we find more points of agreements. Both the raped pregnant woman and the person who the violinist is attached to are products of coercion.[8] In addition, the child conceived from a rape encounter and the violinist who is attached to you are also the results of coercive acts.[9] Although even here we find the significant disagreement between the conceived child’s rightful natural place versus the trespassing out-of-place violinist. Although it is clear the victimized woman never consented to being raped, it cannot be said that the conceived child is trespassing, for it resides in the most biologically natural place available to him (his mother’s womb). Finally, the coercive sexual rapist finds agreement with the analogy’s Music Lovers Society in that both are pursuing coercive acts.[10]
4. In Vitro?

After such an analysis, it appears there are too great a number of disagreements between the analogy of the violinist and the real world occurrence of normative pregnancies to determine the analogy legitimately alludes to the moral permissibility of abortion in such cases. The contrasting elements of coercion versus consent, natural versus unnatural, and rightful place versus trespassing are too significant to ignore. Rather, we find that the analogy agrees most with the real world occurrence of coerced pregnancies. However, even though we find larger points of agreements (especially when comparing persons), there still exist legitimate elements of contrast. For one, regardless of the horror of coercive and invasive sexual reproduction, the child conceived is always the result of a natural biological contact. The rapist trespasses against a woman’s body when he coerces her, however if a child is conceived, its natural environment is in fact its mother’s womb. It would seem that in this, the analogy proves itself quite weak. Perhaps the analogy better fits with an incident where another woman’s egg is fertilized in vitro, and then forcefully implanted to a woman’s uterus against her will. It would appear such a scenario would appear more unnatural, for the child is not in its rightful and natural environment (it is not in its biological mother’s womb), nor is it the product of natural sexual reproduction (it is the product of in vitro experimentation). Perhaps Rachels’ analogy then doesn’t accurately represent incidents of normative or coerced pregnancies, but an unnatural in vitro forced implantation.

IV. Thomson’s Response

As to be expected, Thomson appears to have responses to the issue of consenting to being pregnant, as well as whether a child has a right to grow within its mother’s womb. Thomson’s responses are found in two analogies. The first describes an incident where a woman chooses to open her window, and the absurdity of concluding if a burglar climbed in that she consented to his presence.[11] Thomson then provides a second analogy that strengthens the point of the first by introducing an incident of an innocent spore intruder who happens to plant itself in the woman’s home again her efforts to prevent such an occurrence.[12] Although both of these analogies attempt to centralize the issue of consent, as well as the lack of right both the spore and the burglar have to stay within the woman’s home, they both fail on the grounds of being either a case of trespassing and/or unnatural occurrences. Two new analogies will argue these points.

V. Counter Rebuttal

1. Analogy: The Burglar & The Homeowner II

Imagine our robber were to break into a home in the hopes of robbing it. Having read the owner’s Facebook statuses, he was sure the owner would not be home. The robber took every precaution to make sure the house he was robbing would be vacant. However, upon breaking in, he finds the owner in his natural environment. Two scenarios could then play out:

(1) The robber, who did not plan on the man being home, decides to kill him and continue to rob the house.
(2) The owner, who is in his natural environment, decides to defend himself and shoots the robber dead.

The first scenario is normally observed as the more unjust of the two. Our legal society would increase the man’s punishment beyond the amount given for simple robbery. Why is this? The thief is trespassing (invading the natural territory of another), robbing (attempting to unnaturally rob another person of his rightful items), and now committing murder (robbing the man of the most inalienable of possessions, innocent life).

The second scenario is normally observed as the more just of the two. The owner would have every right to defend his home, given he is in his natural and rightful environment. Furthermore, if the man’s wife and kids were sleeping, he would have additional incentive to protect them, for who knows if this trespassing, robbing, murdering and morally bankrupt individual would also be open to the option of rape? In all normality, we would commend the owner’s defensive actions, for he never had consented to being robbed or murdered.

The owner is the one who has the best claim of being justified by consent. He had never consented to ill being committed against him. In addition, he was both innocent and in his rightful natural environment. The robber’s injustice is that, regardless of not consenting to being caught or punished, he was unnaturally pursuing a means to his selfish end (self-enrichment by robbery). Greater still, he willfully acted in a way to rob one of something that precedes and makes possible all consent: Life. Given the owner was both in his rightful and natural environment, this results with a natural conclusion: He is the one in whom we should focus on in regards to consent. The same can then be said of Thomson’s analogy of the violinist and abortion. For one, it does not hold. Individuals do not naturally find that their sleep results in the forced attachment of famous violinists. Sex naturally results in pregnancy. Nor can they state their not consenting to becoming pregnant somehow removes of them the responsibility there-of, any more than the claim to not getting caught and/or punished removes the responsibility of the robber of getting jailed.

2. Analogy: The Homeowner’s Surprise

We can devise an analogy superior to the spore, which better addresses reality and our given scenario. Let us assume the homeowner is a woman who engaged in consensual sex with a man. She decides to carry the child to term and deliver it at home with the help of the biological father. Upon giving birth, she loses consciousness and all memory of ever being pregnant or giving birth.[13] Let us also assume the father steals the baby away to never be seen again. This woman goes on living her life, until one day at the door appears some government officials with a baby they state is hers, has no other family, and is a product her consensual sex acts. Thus, the child naturally belongs to the care of her mother. In addition, given she is the mother’s daughter; the child has a claim that the house is her rightful place. Unlike the robber, who was trespassing, and the spore, which was unnaturally implanting, this daughter has every right, by the very basis of the natural maternal order, to live with her mother and under her care. If anything, we assume that the responsibility to care for the child is firmly established. Let us say that the mother, worried about the costs of raising a child, or feelings of not being prepared to be a mother, or simply the desire to not take on the difficulties of child-bearing which would then impede her lifestyle, decides to call a professional over who then proceeds to cut up the daughter into pieces and vacuum her up for disposal. After all, it is the woman’s home. She should have every right to defend herself against the nuisance of this child. However, we look upon such a scenario with horror (and rightfully so)! Such an incident would lead to public outcry and government intervention. As for the reason why, it is simple: this girl is first and foremost a human person (and Thomson has already conceded personhood), is the natural product of sexual reproduction, and is not trespassing. This is all made ever the more horrid by the very fact that we expect this mother to fulfill her motherly duty, which chief amongst them is protecting her child from harm. The fact that she would simply invite such a professional into her home to perform such a task is ever more ghastly! This analogy has more points of similarity and comparison with the actual reality of abortion than Thomson’s burglar and spore. It is then a wonder that, given the common sense reactions we have to the above hinted monstrosity, and the importance trespassing and unnatural claims make regarding the analogies, we do not observe the real practice of abortion with such charged opposition.

3. Consent of the Child

Furthermore, the grounds of consent would seem to make the argument against abortion, not for it. For the child itself, equal in its share of human life, appears more similar to the male Home Owner of our first analogy than to the Robber. It is in its rightful and natural environment (the womb) after a natural cause to its existence (sex). It is also innocent (given it is in its natural rightful state and acting with malicious intent). To claim the child is somehow not innocent because it desires the natural nourishment of its mother is as bizarre a claim that a 1 year old is not innocent because it desires the continual care of its parents. Finally, and essentially, the child does not consent to having its life absolutely terminated. Her analogy fails in these two fundamental ways: First, her occurrence is unnatural. Second, the human child is the one whose consent matters most, given it is simply behaving in an innocent way according to its nature and in its rightful natural environment. If consent were truly the issue for Thomas, she would then conclude that, given the distinctions made above, the child’s consent to not be murdered makes abortion morally unjust.

VI. Conclusion

It has been the opinion of this essay that Thomson’s Violinist analogy fails to present normative occurring pregnancies. As we demonstrated, there are simply too many major differences between the event, acts, and persons of the analogy and those of abortions in response to normal pregnancies. Although the analogy seemed to have some points of connection with the case of rape, the fact that incidents of rape make up less than 0.5% of abortions make the analogy lacking in value. Even then, we noticed that there still existed significant differences between the analogy and the incident of abortions responding to rape. Although Thomson sought to buffer such objections two additional analogies, they failed on the grounds of the observed differences (unnatural and issues of trespassing). We utilized two analogies to demonstrate this weakness, as well as the additional explanatory power they offered in placing the issue of consent on the side of the child. Surely the child has no other desirable function then to simply exist and grow. Given its innocence, and the special natural relationship between a mother and a child, it is amazing that we would position one’s desire over one’s rightful consent.  For these reasons we may affirm the failure of the violinist analogy, as well as its inability to address the overwhelming majority of abortions.


1. [1] RE1 vs. AE1 (Normative Pregnancy Event vs. Analogy Plugging The Violinist Event)

a.      Agree

i.       Dependency vs. Dependency

b.      Disagree

i.       Natural vs. Unnatural

ii.      Consented vs. Coerced

2. [2] RE2 vs. AE1 (Coerced Pregnancy Event vs. Analogy Plugging the Violinist Event)

a.      Agree

i.       Dependency vs. Dependency

ii.      Coerced vs. Coerced

b.      Disagree

i.       Natural vs. Unnatural

1. [3] RA1 vs. AA1 (Real Abortion Act vs. Analogy Unplugging Act)

a.      Agree

i.       Death vs. Death

ii.      Unnatural vs. Unnatural

b.      Disagree

i.       Murder vs. Let Die

1. [4] RP1 vs. AP1 (Real Normative Pregnancy Related Persons vs. Analogy Persons)

a.      RP1.1 vs. AP1.1 (Real Normatively Pregnant Woman vs. Analogy You)

i.       Agree

ii.      Disagree

  • Natural vs. Unnatural
  • Consented vs. Coerced

b.      RP1.2 vs. AP1.2 (Real Conceived Child vs. Analogy Violinist)

i.       Agree

ii.      Disagree

  • Natural vs. Unnatural
  • Consented vs. Coerced
  • Rightful Place vs. Trespassing

c.      RP1.3 vs. AP1.3 (Real Consented Sexual Partner vs. Analogy Music Lover’s Society)

i.       Agree

ii.      Disagree

  • Natural vs. Unnatural
  • Consented vs. Coercer

2. [5] RP1 vs. AP1 (Real Normative Pregnancy Related Persons vs. Analogy Persons)

a.      RP1.1 vs. AP1.1 (Real Normatively Pregnant Woman vs. Analogy You)

i.       Agree

ii.      Disagree

  • Natural vs. Unnatural
  • Consented vs. Coerced

3. [6] RP1 vs. AP1 (Real Normative Pregnancy Related Persons vs. Analogy Persons)

a.      RP1.2 vs. AP1.2 (Real Conceived Child vs. Analogy Violinist)

i.       Agree

ii.      Disagree

  • Natural vs. Unnatural
  • Consented vs. Coerced
  • Rightful Place vs. Trespassing

4. [7] RP1 vs. AP1 (Real Normative Pregnancy Related Persons vs. Analogy Persons)

a.      RP1.3 vs. AP1.3 (Real Consented Sexual Partner vs. Analogy Music Lover’s Society)

i.       Agree

ii.      Disagree

  • Natural vs. Unnatural
  • Consented vs. Coercer

5. [8] RP2 vs. AP1 (Real Coerced Pregnancy Related Persons vs. Analogy Persons)

a.      RP2.1 vs. AP1.1 (Real Coerced Pregnant Woman vs. Analogy You)

i.       Agree

  • Coerced vs. Coerced

ii.      Disagree

6. [9] RP2 vs. AP1 (Real Coerced Pregnancy Related Persons vs. Analogy Persons)

a.      RP2.2 vs. AP1.2 (Real Conceived Child vs. Analogy Violinist)

i.       Agree

  • Coerced vs. Coerced

ii.      Disagree

  • Natural vs. Unnatural
  • Rightful Place vs. Trespasser

7. [10] RP2 vs. AP1 (Real Coerced Pregnancy Related Persons vs. Analogy Persons)

a.      RP2.3 vs. AP1.3 (Real Coercive Sexual Rapist vs. Analogy Music Society)

i.       Agree

  • Coercer vs. Coercer

ii.      Disagree

[11] “If the room is stuffy, and I therefore open a window to air it, and a burglar climbs in, it would be absurd to say, “Ah, now he can stay… for she is partially responsible for his presence there.” (216)

[12] “people-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take took in your carpets and upholstery. You don’t want children, so you fix up your windows with fine mesh screens… however, and on very, very rare occasions does happen, one of the screens is defective; and a seed drifts in and takes root. Does the person-plant who now develops have a right to the use of your house? Surely not,” (216)

[13] Clearly this example is hypothetical and unrealistic in a worldly sense, thus it being an analogy, however it is clearly no more ridiculous then spores which ingrain with carpets and develop into persons

Advertisements

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s